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Model-Based Threat Assessment for Lane Guidance Systems
Mohammad Ali, Paolo Falcone and Jonas Sjo¨berg
Abstract— This paper considers a threat assessment problem
in a lane guidance application for semi-autonomous vehicles.
In particular, in order to issue an autonomous assisting inter-
vention, we assess the vehicle’s ability to safely travel along a
path subject to limitations arising from the vehicle’s dynamics
and the driver’s ability.
We first introduce a set of constraints describing “safe
driving”. For the specific lane guidance application considered
in this paper, the constraints are set by the lane boundaries
and the vehicle’s stability limits. We then formulate the threat
assessment problem as a constraints satisfaction problem over a
finite time horizon, solved by resorting to reachabililty analysis
and invariant set theory.
Validation with experimental data demonstrates the capa-
bility of the proposed threat assessment method of predicting
vehicle instability or crossing of the lane boundaries.
Index Terms— Invariant Set Theory, Semi-Autonomous Ve-
hicles, Threat Assessment, Decision Making, Active Safety.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we focus on semi-autonomous vehicles,
i.e., human driven vehicles with autonomous driving capa-
bilities. We consider lane guidance applications, where the
driver has to be assisted in maintaining the vehicle within
the lane boundaries, through assisting autonomous driving
interventions. A challenging aspect of such problems is to
determine when the driver needs assistance since an assisting
autonomous driving intervention should be issued if and only
if a risk of accident is detected, that the driver is not able
to avoid. The formulation of transition conditions, between
the different modes of a semi-autonomos vehicle, e.g., from
a driver-controlled to a fully autonomous assisting mode, is
not trivial.
In the threat assessment methods considered in this paper,
we first introduce a set of constraints describing “safe” driv-
ing, i.e., the constraints satisfaction would result in an acci-
dent free driving. Moreover, we assume the road geometry
is available over a future finite time horizon and exploit the
vehicle modeling in order to calculate a “safe set”. This is the
set of vehicle states at current time t for which a steering
trajectory exists such that, over a finite time horizon, the
vehicle state evolves to a given final set without violating
constraints. Once the safe set is computed, a set membership
test on the current vehicle state is performed. If the current
state belongs to the safe set, a steering trajectory exists such
that the vehicle can be driven over the considered future time
horizon without exceeding its stability limits and leaving
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the lane. We remark that the safe set can be used in the
autonomous driving mode to determine when the control of
the vehicle can be released and given back to the driver.
Moreover, the safe set can be used as a target set where the
autonomous driving system should steer the vehicle state in
order to let the driver recover the vehicle control and safely
complete the driving task.
Similar ideas can be found in [1], [2], [3] in the automotive
and aerospace fields, respectively. In [1], the authors propose
a collision detection method in autonomous driving. In
particular, a traffic scenario is considered where the path
of an autonomous ego car has to be planned in order to
avoid collisions with other traffic participants, whose future
trajectory is unknown. A safe planned path for the ego car
is required to not intersect the stochastic reachable sets
computed for each traffic participant, i.e., the future set of
positions possibly occupied by the other traffic participants.
In [2], a safety analysis of an aircraft autoland system is
developed based on the calculation of reachable sets. In the
landing phase, the set of the aircraft configurations, evolving
within a safe envelope to the set of acceptable states at
touchdown, is calculated as a backward reachable set. The
algorithm in [3] is used, computing the reachable sets of a
nonlinear system based on a time-dependent Hamilton-Jacobi
PDE.
We demonstrate the proposed threat assessment method
in a roadway departure application, and validate it through
experimental data. The paper is organized as follows. In
Section II we overview the considered semi-autonomous
driving architecture while in Section III, we provide ba-
sic definitions and results on reachability analysis and set
invariance theory. In Section IV, we present the modeling
used in Section V, where the threat assessment algorithm is
presented. In Section VI, we validate the proposed algorithm
and in Section VII we close the paper with final remarks.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
We consider the accident avoidance architecture presented
in [4] and sketched in Figure 1. The architecture is general
and can be used in any accident avoidance or mitigation
application. In Figure 1, we distinguish a threat assessment
and an intervention layer. The two layers share information
about the environment provided by the environment informa-
tion block.
Based on measurements and estimation of the vehicle
state, the threat assessment utilizes preview information in
order to evaluate the risk of roadway departure or vehicle
instability. As long as the threat assessment indicates a low
threat level, the driver has full control of the vehicle. The type
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Fig. 1. Overview of the suggested accident prevention architecture.
of intervention issued, can then range from merely assisting
the driver by slightly correcting his or her control action to
completely excluding the driver in a completely autonomous
mode. The output of the decision making module can thus
be the choice of a lower level controller implemented in the
intervention module. A mathematical formulation of such
a decision making framework along with an example of a
lower level controller that utilizes combined front steering
and differential braking in order to follow a safe path is
provided in [4]. In the rest of the paper, we focus on the
threat assessment module of the architecture in Figure 1.
III. BACKGROUND ON SET INVARIANCE THEORY AND
REACHABILILTY ANALYSIS
This section adopts the notation used in [5], [6], [7] and
provides the basic definitions of invariant and reachable sets
for constrained systems. A comprehensive survey of papers
on set invariance theory can be found in [8]. We will denote
the set of all real numbers and positive integers by R and N+,
respectively.
Denote by f the state update function of the discrete-time
system with inputs
x(t+ 1) = f(x(t), u(t), w(t)), (1)
where x(t), u(t) and w(t) denote the state, input and
disturbance vectors, respectively. System (1) is subject to
the constraints
x(t) ∈ X , u(t) ∈ U , w(t) ∈ W . (2)
The set of states which can be driven into the target set S
in one time step is defined as
Pref (S) , {x ∈ X | ∃u ∈ U s.t. f(x, u) ∈ S} (3)
The following definitions are derived from [8], [9], [10],
[11].
Definition 1 (Control Invariant Set): A set C ⊆ X is said
to be a control invariant set for the system (1) subject to the
constraints (2), if
x(t) ∈ C ⇒ ∃u(t) ∈ U : f(x(t), u(t)) ∈ C, ∀t ∈ N+
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. Vehicle modeling notation.
Definition 2 (Maximal Control Invariant Set C∞): The
set C∞ is said to be the maximal control invariant set for
the system (1) subject to the constraints (2), if it is control
invariant and contains all control invariant sets contained in
X .
For all states contained in the maximal control invariant set
C∞ there exists a control law, such that the system constraints
are never violated.
IV. MODELING
In this section, we present the vehicle mathematical model
used in Section V, as basis of the threat assessment algo-
rithm.
A. Vehicle Modeling
Consider the vehicle model sketched in Figure 2. The
vehicle motion within the lane, subject to the lateral and yaw
dynamics, is described by the following set of differential
equations
mv˙y = −mvxψ˙ + 2
[
Fyf + Fyr
]
, (4a)
Jzψ¨ = 2[lfFyf − lrFyr ], (4b)
e˙ψ = ψ˙ − ψ˙d, (4c)
e˙y = vy + vxeψ, (4d)
δ˙ = u, (4e)
where m and Jz denote the vehicle mass and yaw inertia,
respectively, lf and lr are the distances of the vehicle center
of gravity from the front and rear axles, respectively, vx
and vy are the longitudinal and lateral velocities, respec-
tively, in the vehicle body frame, ψ˙ is the turning rate,
where ψ denotes the vehicle orientation w.r.t. the fixed
global frame (X,Y ) in Figure 2(a). Fyf , Fyr are the lateral
tire forces at the front and rear axles, respectively. In (4c)
and (4d), eψ and ey denote the vehicle orientation and
position errors, respectively, w.r.t. the road centerline and ψd
is the desired vehicle orientation, i.e., the slope of the tangent
to the curve Γd in the point O. δ denotes the front steering
angle as depicted in Figure 2(b) and u is the external input
signal. The choice of input signal is commented next, in
Section IV-B.
The lateral tire forces in (4a) and (4b) are generated at the
tire contact patch and are, in general, nonlinear functions of
the vehicle states. Accurate physical modeling of tire forces
is quite involving and several models have been proposed
in the literature over the past two decades. An exhaustive
review of existing tire models can be found in [12]. In this
paper, we compute the lateral tire forces as
Fy,i = −Ciαi, i ∈ {f, r}, (5)
where Ci are the tire cornering stiffness coefficients at the
two axles and αi are the tire slip angles which, for small
values, can be approximated as
αf =
vy + lf ψ˙
vx
− δ, (6a)
αr =
vy − lrψ˙
vx
. (6b)
Remark 1: The simplified linear tire model (5) well ap-
proximates more complex nonlinear tire characteristics [13]
for small tire slip angles, i.e., αi ∈ [αimin , αimax ]. However,
this interval also corresponds to a “normal driving” region
where drivers usually operate [14], [15].
B. System Constraints
In Figure 3, an illustration of two different scenarios,
targeted by the threat assessment method presented in this
paper, is provided. In Figure 3(a) the roadway departure
occurs because of a vehicle drift, while in Figure 3(b) the
vehicle instead operates beyond its stability limits.
Next we define a set of operating conditions, in the space
of the states and inputs of system (4), corresponding to stable
driving within the lane boundaries and the system physical
limitations. In order to avoid possible vehicle instability due
to the effects of the tire nonlinearities (see Remark 1), the
vehicle can be forced to operate in a region of the state space
corresponding to limited values of the tire slip angles α
αimin ≤ αi ≤ αimax , i ∈ {f, r} (7)
Furthermore, constraints on vehicle position are set by the
limited lane width. In order to formulate the constraints on
the vehicle position within the lane, we denote by eyij , i ∈
{f, r}, j ∈ {l, r}, the distances of the four vehicle corners
Fig. 3. Two pre-crash scenarios that might lead to unwanted roadway
departures. In (a) the vehicle leaves the road while traveling on a straight,
possibly due to drowsiness or distraction, while in (b) the vehicle loses
control while negotiating a curve. The latter might typically occur due to
excessive speed.
from the lane centerline. By assuming small orientation
errors,
eyfl = ey +
c
2
+ aeψ, eyfr = ey −
c
2
+ aeψ, (8a)
eyrl = ey +
c
2
− beψ, eyrr = ey −
c
2
− beψ, (8b)
where c is the vehicle width, a and b are the distances of the
center of gravity from the front and rear vehicle bumpers,
respectively. The constraints on the vehicle position and slip
angles then read
eymin ≤ eyij ≤ eymax , (9a)
αimin ≤ αi ≤ αimax , i ∈ {f, r}, j ∈ {l, r}, (9b)
where eymin and eymax set the maximum allowed deviation
from the lane centerline.
Remark 2: The model (4)-(6), subject to constraints (9),
describes the stable vehicle motion within the lane. In such
operating conditions the small orientation errors assumption
is deemed reasonable.
Constraints on the steering angle δ are set by mechanical
limitations while the steering rate δ˙ is constrained by the
driver’s ability to change the steering angle. Hence, we
consider the steering rate δ˙ as input signal and impose the
following constraints,
−δmax ≤ δ ≤ δmax, (10a)
−
δ˙swmax
g
≤ u ≤
δ˙swmax
g
, (10b)
where δ˙swmax denotes the maximally attainable steering angle
rate at the steering wheel and g is the gear ratio between the
steering wheel and the tires.
The model (4)-(6), along with the constraints (9), (10) can
be compactly written as
x˙(t) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) + Ew(t) (11a)
subj. to
[
Hx 0
0 Hu
](
x
u
)
≤
[
hx
hu
]
(11b)
where x =
[
vy, ψ˙, eψ, ey, δ
]T
, u = δ˙ and w = ψ˙d are
the state, the input and the disturbance vectors, respectively.
The definition of matrices A, B, E, Hx, Hu, hx and hu
is straightforward and omitted due to lack of space.
V. SET BASED THREAT ASSESSMENT
In this section we propose a threat assessment method
based on the vehicle model presented in Section IV.The idea
underlying the proposed method is to first introduce a set of
constraints that the vehicle state and input trajectories have
to satisfy in order to “drive safely”. The constraints are set
by the lane boundaries and the stability limits the vehicle
should not exceed, i.e., the inequality (11b). Constraints
satisfaction implies that the vehicle is traveling within the
lane boundaries in a stable operating region. The threat
assessment problem is then reformulated as a constraints
satisfaction problem over a future time horizon, solved
through the predictive model based method described next.
Based on the same underlying ideas, a threat assessment
algorithm is presented in [16]. In [16], the steering angle
δ is computed through a driver model which is restricted
to the class of linear state feedback control laws. In this
paper, instead, we remove this restriction and base the
threat assessment on the existence of any steering trajectory
subject to constraints (10) and guaranteeing a stable vehicle
motion within the lane boundaries. As a consequence of this
relaxation, the threat assessment algorithm presented in this
paper is less restrictive than in [16].
Based on the vehicle model, every time step we calculate
a “safe set”. This is the set of vehicle states at current
time t for which a steering trajectory exists such that, over
a finite time horizon, the vehicle state evolves to a given
final set without violating constraints (11b). The safe set is
updated in receding horizon, as new information about the
surrounding environment are available, e.g., the coming road
curvature in our lane guidance application. Once the safe set
is computed, a set membership test on the current vehicle
state is performed. If the current state belongs to the safe set,
a steering trajectory exists such that the vehicle can be driven
over the considered future time horizon without exceeding
its stability limits and leaving the lane.
We introduce the following assumptions on the disturbance
signal w (i.e., the road curvature)
Assumption 1: w(t) ∈ W , ∀ t ≥ 0, where W ⊆ R2 is a
polyhedron that contains the origin in its interior.
Assumption 2: Every time instant t, the disturbance w(t)
is known over a finite time horizon of N steps.
Remark 3: The sensing technologies used in e.g. [17],
[18], [19] can be used in order to obtain the road geometry
information over a finite time horizon.
We discretize the model (11a) with a sampling time Ts, to
obtain the discrete time constrained system with disturbances
x(t+ 1) = Adx(t) +Bdu(t) + Edw(t) (12a)
subj. to
[
Hx 0
0 Hu
](
x
u
)
≤
[
hx
hu
]
(12b)
where, for the sake of simple notation, we have denoted the
state, the input, the disturbance and the time index with the
same symbols as in the continuous time model (11).
Denote by Xfeas the set of admissible states
Xfeas = {x ∈ R
5 : Hxx ≤ hx}. (13)
Every time instant, we consider a terminal target set T ⊆
Xfeas. Further details about the choice of T are pro-
vided next in Section V-A. Moreover, denote by Wt =
[wt, wt+1, . . . , wt+N−1], the sequence of disturbance sam-
ples over the time horizon [t, t+N − 1] and by Wt,i =
[wt+i, . . . , wt+N−1] any sequence extracted from Wt.
We compute the sequence of states sets Xt (Wt) =
[Xt,Xt+1, . . . ,Xt+N−1] as:
Xt+i (Wt,i) = Xfeas
⋂
Pref (Xt+i+1, wt+i), (14a)
i = N − 1, . . . , 0,
Xt+N = T , (14b)
where, f denotes the right hand side of the (12a). We call
the set Xt the safe set at time t.
We observe that the calculation of the sequence Xt (Wt) is
performed every time step, based on the updated disturbance
sequence Wt. Moreover, in (14), with a slight abuse of
notation, as second argument a vector is used instead of a
set in the set operator Pre·(·, ·).
In summary, the proposed threat assessment algorithm is
made of three main steps to be performed every time step
1) select the terminal target set T ,
2) based on the future disturbance sequence Wt and
the set T , perform the backward calculation of the
sequence of safe sets Xt+i according to (14),
3) check whether the current state x(t) belongs to the safe
set Xt, in order to assess the driver’s ability in safely
driving the vehicle from the current state to the target
set T over the future horizon of N steps.
The steps of the method are detailed next in Algorithm 5.1.
Remark 4: By construction, if the state of the system (12)
at the current time t belongs to the safe set Xt (Step 10
of Algorithm 5.1), a steering trajectory exists such that the
vehicle can be driven over the next N time steps, while
operating within its stability limits and without leaving the
lane. That is, over the future N time steps, the vehicle can
be driven within the lane boundaries, while operating in a
region of the system states and inputs space where the driver
is deemed capable of driving without loosing vehicle stability
(see Remark 1).
Remark 5: The advantage of formulating the threat as-
sessment problem as a constraint satisfaction problem is
the existence of several efficient methods for solving such
problems [20]. An advantage of Algorithm 5.1 is that it
provides a polyhedral representation of safe sets rather than
just a boolean answer. As pointed out in Section I, a
polyhedral representation of the safe set can be exploited
for both control and verification purposes.
As last remark of this section, we observe that the Algo-
rithm 5.1 checks the existence of a steering trajectory capable
Algorithm 5.1:
Input: Current state x(t), target set T , se-
quence of disturbances Wt, state update map-
ping f =
(
Ad, Bd, Ed
)
, the constraints matrices
(Hx, Hu, hx, hu)
Output: The safe set Xt at the current time t, safe
flag Safe
1 let Xt+N = T ,
2 for i = N − 1 to 0
3 let Xt+i+1 = {x ∈ R5 : Hi+1x ≤ hi+1}
4 Pref (Xt+i+1, wt+i) = {x ∈ R5 : ∃ u ∈ R s.t.[
Hi+1A
d Hi+1B
d
0 Hu
](
x
u
)
≤
[
hi+1 −Hi+1Edwt+i
hu
]
},
5 if Pref (Xt+i+1, wt+i) = ∅ then Safe = 0,EXIT
6 else let Pref (Xt+i+1, wt+i) =
{x ∈ R5 : HPrex ≤ hPre},
7 Xt+i (Wt,i) = {x ∈ R5 :[
HPre
Hx
]
x ≤
[
hPre
hx
]
} , end
8 if Xt+i (Wt,i) = ∅ then Safe = 0, EXIT end
9 end
10 if x(t) ∈ Xt then Safe = 1,
11 else Safe = 0, end
12 EXIT.
of driving the vehicle, modeled by (11a), from the current
state x(t) to the target set T . Hence, such trajectory is not
guaranteed to exist after the time t+N . In the next section
we comment the choice of the target set T and propose
a method for guaranteeing persistent constraint satisfaction,
i.e., that the driver will be capable of maintaining the vehicle
within T , for t > t+N .
A. Terminal Set
The choice of the terminal set T in the threat assessment
Algorithm 5.1 affects the effectiveness and the conserva-
tiveness of the algorithm. Indeed, the simplest choice is
setting T = Xfeas. In this case, Algorithm 5.1 can be used
to assess the driver’s ability of safely driving only over the
futureN time steps. As alternative, the set T could be chosen
as T = C∞, where C∞ ⊆ Xfeas is the maximal robust
control invariant set for the system with inputs (12a) subject
to the constraints (12b). We recall that in this case,
x(t+N) ∈ C∞ ⇒ x(t+N+k) ∈ C∞, ∀w(t) ∈ W , k ∈ N
+,
that is, the vehicle will be kept within the lane and its stability
limits, despite all admissible lane curvature beyond the look-
ahead point. Nevertheless, setting the final set equal to the
maximal robust positive invariant set might lead to high
conservativeness of the threat assessment algorithm.
VI. RESULTS
Experiments on a test track have been performed in
order to validate the threat assessment method described in
Section V. The test vehicle has been driven several laps with
different test drivers. The drivers adopted different driving
styles, ranging from normal driving to rough driving. The
test vehicle was equipped with a differential GPS, with built
in Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) and a digital map of
the test track. Through this sensors set, estimates of the full
state and disturbance vectors were available (see Remark 3
for alternative sensor setups).
In Figure 4(a) we illustrate the scenario considered next
for experimental validation. In the considered scenario, the
driver is negotiating a curve at a constant speed of approx-
imately 90 km/h. Consider the vehicle positions 1 and 2
on the track, shown in figure 4(a). Denote by t1 and t2
the time instants, when the vehicle is in positions 1 and
2, respectively. The dashed lines starting from the vehicle
denote the horizon of N steps, over which the disturbance is
assumed to be known. In the two vehicle positions we have
computed the safe sets Xt1 and Xt2 , respectively, according
to the threat assessment algorithm in Section V, where we
have set T = Xfeas as terminal set and used the following
parameters
αfmax = αrmax = −αfmin = −αrmin = 4
◦,
δmax = 10
◦, δ˙swmax = 300
◦/s, N = 35, Ts = 0.01s,
eymax = −eymin = 1.56m.
In Figures 4(b) and 4(c) the polyhedra X 3,4t1 and X 3,4t2 are
shown, where
X 3,4t = Xt
⋂
{x ∈ R5 :

 1 0 0 0 00 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1

 x =

 x
1(t)
x2(t)
x5(t)

}
(15)
and the superscript i in xi(t) denote the i-th component
of the current vehicle state vector x(t). The states x(t1)
and x(t2) are marked with a circle in Figures 4(b) and 4(c),
respectively. We observe that x(t1) ∈ X 3,4t1 and x(t2) /∈
X 3,4t2 . Hence, according to the proposed threat assessment
algorithm, from the initial state x(t1), it is possible to safely
drive the vehicle over a horizon of N steps without violating
any of the state and input constraints. From the initial
state x(t2), on the other hand, the vehicle state trajectory is
predicted to violate the constraints (13). The measured state
trajectories are also reported in Figures 4(b) and (c) with
dashed lines. We observe that in Figure 4(b), starting from
the initial state x(t1), the state trajectory entirely evolves
within the set T1 =
t1+N−1⋃
t=t1
T 3,4, where the sets T 3,4 are
obtained by replacing Xt with T in (15). In Figure 4(c),
instead, we observe that the state trajectory leaves the
set T2 =
t2+N−1⋃
t=t2
T 3,4, i.e., the vehicle violates the bounds
on the lateral deviation from the lane centerline.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 4. Plot (a) shows the vehicle while negotiating a curve. Plot (b) shows
the safe set at point 1 in (a) while plot (c) shows the safe set at point 2. In
plots (b) and (c), the circles denote the current state while the dashed line
shows the measured state trajectory over the horizon.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
We have presented a model based threat assessment
method for semi-autonomous vehicles. The algorithm is
based on reachability analysis tools and set invariance theory.
The method has been validated offline using experimental
data. The obtained results demonstrate that the proposed
method can effectively predict lane crossing and vehicle
instability over a future, finite time horizon, allowing the
activation of an autonomous intervention.
The preliminary results presented in this manuscript moti-
vate further investigations aiming at analyzing the impact
of measurements errors and model uncertainties on the
performance of the proposed threat assessment method and
proposing approaches in order to compensate for them.
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